1871-1900 Yaquina Head Lighthouse Letter books

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Pages That Mention Strait of Juan de Fuca

Coast Guard District narrative histories 1945

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LIGHT STATIONS

The "romance" of the old Lighthouse has been lost, for the most part, by the mechanization of the lights and the modernization of related equipment. Isolated lighthouse sites have radio or telephone communication, motor launches, and electrically operated lights or signals. The oil lantern has been superceded and supplemented by radio aids - raidobeacons, RADAR beacons and LORAN. In addition to the lights' rays, there are "pips" and "blips" and "pulses" to guide the mariner to safety. However, though these electronic aids be far more reaching and provide greater accuracy than the light, they can never instill the same warm rush of relief and thanksgiving that fills the sailor's heart when the first pale rays of a familiar light beacon breaks through the fog and rain after anxious hours on a stormy sea.

When the Lighthouse Service consolidated with the Coast Guard, 31 major light stations were among the facilities transferred to the Seattle District.¹ Many of these Light Stations had tales of heroism, danger and tragedy woven into their histories. The oldest of these stations were the lights at Cape Disappointment and New Dungeness, completed in 1856 as the first activity of the Lighthouse Service in the new frontier - the Pacific Northwest.

The New Dungeness Lighthouse was built in 1857 on a spit off the south shore of the Strait of Juan de Fuca near the entrance to Puget Sound. Cape Disappointment Beacon was constructed on the only headland of the low beach between Tillamook Head and Point Grenville (80 miles), on the north point of the entrance to the Columbia River. The following year, another lighthouse was erected on Tatoosh Island just off the tip of Cape Flattery. The Island had previously been used as a whaling station and fishing headquarters by the Indians who had been, until then, the sole inhabitants. Before the Lighthouse was built, a blockade was established and muskets furnished to the workmen as protection against marauding Indians. The first Keeper of the station resigned because of the "annoyances" he and the other 3 white men suffered at the hands of the 250 Indians living there. Because of the treacherous waters and shoals, the easiest access to the Island was by a huge basket. In calm weather, boats could land on the beach but the basket method was the more dependable. This was by no means a "primitive" devise, for the basket and its hoist are still the best means to effect a landing.

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for 16 months before it was decided that the only possible means of returning her to her station was by hauling her overland through the woods and launching her in the Columbia River. The No. 50 was constructed of wood and remained in service only until 1909 when she was replaced by the steel-hulled lightship.

During the amalgamation of the Lighthouse Service and The Coast Guard in 1939, four lightships, the COLUMBIA RIVER LIGHTSHIP 393, the UMATILLA REEF LIGHTSHIP #88, the RELIEF LIGHTSHIP #92 and the SWIFTSURE LIGHTSHIP #113, were transferred to the Coast Guard. These four lightships maintained only three stations as the RELIEF LIGHTSHIP #92 was used on all stations as relief. They were steel-hulled vessels with a displacement of approximately 685 tones and a complement of 3 to 6 officers and 5 to 11 crew. All but one was built around 1908; the SWIFTSURE LIGHTSHIP #113 was the newest and it was completed in 1929. In addition to exhibiting a bright beacon light, the lightships were also equipped with sound signals, [radio]], radio-telephone, and radiobeacons. In addition to their regular duties as lightships, they were also instructed during the early days of the war, to notify the Commandant, 13th Naval District of all vessels passing the Columbia River northbound.

At the outbreak of the war, LIGHTSHIPS NO. 88 and 113, were removed from their stations by the Navy and replaced by lighted whistle buoys. The ships were reconverted by removing the radiobeacon and antenna mast, by installing armament, by realtering radio facilities and by increasing the complement to 30 Coast Guardsmen and 5 Coast Guard Officers. The No. 88 was then placed in the Strait of Juan de Fuca as a Recognition Ship and the No 113 was sent into Alaskan waters. The removal of these two ships left only the COLUMBIA RIVER LIGHTSHIP #93 on station at the entrance to the Columbia River with the No. 92 to be used as its relief.

The use of one lightship as standby only, seemed most uneconomical of ships and men at a time when they were at a premium. The District Coast Guard Officer, with the approval of the Commander, Northwest Sea Frontier, proposed to Headquarters that the COLUMBIA RIVER LIGHTSHIP #93 should remain on station for a month and then, on a clear day with good weather, the ship would leave her station, go to Astoria for fuel and supplies and return before dark. A station buoy would be placed close to the Lightship's position at all times and mark the station when the Lightship itself was absent. Such an arrangement would permit the RELIEF LIGHTSHIP to be used as part of the Offshore Observation Force.

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This plan met Headquarters' approval but was put into operation for only a brief time. Too many difficulties resulted to warrant the discontinuance of the relief. Water, sufficient only for 25 days, could be carried and this supply was greatly diminished when the fog signal was in operation. Special trips to replenish the water were made by the tenders, requiring a full day from their regular duties in the servicing of aids. The motor lifeboats were also required to deliver fresh food and vegetables and medical supplies. In addition to these difficulties, the proper operation of the radiobeacon was affected; batteries only charged full when the ship was off station because when charged over 1190 specific gravity while on station, the timer on the radiobeacon was thrown off. The 24-hour continuous beacon operation was a tremendous strain on the storage battery and generating equipment. The two-week schedule was not interrupted again until the RELIEF LIGHTSHIP #92 was placed on the Recognition Station, Strait of Juan de Fuca when the No. 88 needed relief for repairs. During one such relief, the Commanding Officer of the No. 92, a Chief Boatswain, performed the duties which were ordinarily handled by the seven officers aboard the Recognition Ship. Because of the efficient manner in which he handled this station, the Chief Boatswain was highly commended by the Navy.

Although the Light List indicated that radio messages of importance in the maintenance of aids to navigation, or on other urgent matters, could be received during the first fifteen minutes of each hour from 0800 to 2015, this service was not used for many years and, consequently, was discontinued in 1944 in order to replace the radioman who serviced the equipment by a radio technician to handle the radiobeacon equipment. The necessity of a technician became evident when a failure of the radiobeacon could not be remedied due to the lack of spare tubes aboard. A survey of the stock proved an adequate supply of tubes on hand, but the radioman was unfamiliar with the beacon equipment.

The war altered but slightly the routine of the LIGHTSHIP #92 and #93. Other than the issuance of small arms and a lookout for the northbound vessels, the lightships maintained and performed their peacetime duties. The regular radiobeacon equipment was operated alternately with the standby equipment to insure proper operation and repair on both units. It was discovered that the antenna on the main equipment was more efficient than that on the standby equipment so an antenna transfer switch was installed to permit operation of both transmitters on the main antenna. To preclude any failure of

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BLACKOUT

"Blackout" entered the universal vocabulary with the advent of World War II, although, it had, in some degree, been used in all previous wars. The blacking out of municipal lights became the activity of the Civilian Defense Organization, but the problem of extinguishing lights on river and railroad bridges and the blacking out and silencing of navigational aids fell to the Coast Guard. Accordingly, The Commandant advised all Districts in October, 1940, that plans for the extinguishment of lighted aids and the silencing of sound signals were to be prepared in the event of a serious national emergency. In the 13th Naval District, a Board was immediately organized for the purpose of making a study of meeting any emergency which called for the purpose of interruption of the operation of navigational aids in the Seattle District, including all Canadian aids in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The District Coast Guard Officer ordered this Board to study the Strategic areas of the Columbia River entrance, to study several bar harbor entrances, San Juan Islands and the Puget Sound Area, and to formulate a Blackout Plan. The Plan was submitted to the Commandant, 13th Naval District for approval, as the Coast Guard operated its blackout through the Senior Naval Officer of the District.

This Blackout Plan, as approved in September, 1941, divided the District into seven areas, designated as Blacks One to Seven, and each Black was further subdivided into seven sections indicated by letter so that any part of any area could be blacked out separately. The "S" Code, developed previously by Communications for exclusive use in this District, was enlarged to accommodate blackout activities in all communication between Coast Guard units. For example, if all aids in the District were to be blacked out, the "S" signal was "Signal 26"; if the lights were to be blacked out and the sound signals silenced, the "S" signal was "Signal 138". If a blackout was designated in Black One Area, the signal was "Signal 26-1A", etc. An "S" Code Signal Book was published for issuance to all units. Appropriate "S" signals were also prepared for the relighting of all aids.

Radiobeacons were not silenced under the general blackout but were covered by individual instructions to the Commanding Officers as required. Although an effort was made to cover all aids, it was understood that aids omitted or aids established after the Plan was distributed were to

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