Miriam Van Waters Papers. Male Prisoner Correspondence, 1927-1971. Correspondence: M, 1931-1932. A-71, folder 610. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

[top left] Name Miss Miriam Van Waters

Street & Number 7 Riedesel ave.

City Cambridge State Mass

[top right] Box 1112

Joliet, Illinois

Feb. 27, Sat. 1932

[stamp] CENSORED 1

[left] My Dear Miss Van Waters:

I received your most welcome letter today, so thought I would answer it you are wanting to know how my case is coming along.

Mother was saying Thursday when the folks came up here to visit me, that B.J . Knight the Rockford lawyer said, the Supreme Court after listening to Darrow they descided to wait till the april court before giving out their verdict, I have a book here containing my case, the errors in my trial before Judge [Fisher?]. they are asking for a life sentence or a new trial, people say Darrow gave a wonderful talk before the court.

That is my full knowledge of affairs. But I have the highest of hopes, you see my idea is this I thank the good mercyfull Lord for the care he has taken of me, and surely and truely we can depend on him for the rest. You see I think you are a very busy little lady so when no answer came to my last letter I took it for granted you were in some auther

part of the country helping some author unfortunate people out of a sorry mess, such as mine. I must congratulate you for the new position you hold as superintendent of the reformatory. it is a very fine position I am sure.

also the inmates are lucky in having such a good superintendent

a lady in Rockford has arranged a bible course for me, but I think I will have to get out of solitary first, but I pray thee dont let that hinder any of your suggestions.

having four bibles now, I think I wont need any more of them.

I am very sorry Miss Binford is ill, I hope she gets well rapidly, if you see her give her my best regards, you asked who are my lawyers Clarence Darrow, William H. Holly, Thomas F Ryan, of Chicago, BJ knight, Penny, and Lupton of Rockford Ill. My case will remain closed till the april court, I will let you know the date when I find out, I could'nt express my thanks for what you have done for me if I tried, But I think you will understand I am very grateful, and always will be very truly and sincerely yours

Russell

Russell McWilliams

[center bottom] 5661

[bottom right] 1900 Collins street

Joliet Ill.

Docket no. 21223--Agenda 58--February, 1932

The people of the State of Illinois. Defendant in Error. v. Russel Robert McWilliams. Plaintiff in error.

MR. JUSTICE JONES delivered the opinion of the court:

In the Circuit Court of Winnebago County Russell McWilliams was sentenced to death upon a plea of guilty for the murder of William Sayles. On August 29, 1931, the date of the homicide, McWilliams was seventeen years and eleven days old. The plea of guilty was entered October 26, 1931, and two days thereafter the presiding judge heard evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the crime, at the conclusion of which a judgment fixing the death penalty was entered. The cause was brought to this court by writ of error.

The errors assigned do not question the guilt of the defendent but challenge the manner and method of the trial judge in conducting the hearing in aggravation and mitigation of the offense. They also challenge the discretion of the court in imposing a sentence of death. In view of the fact that the guilt of the defendant is admitted, only a brief statement of facts concerning the commission of the crime is necessary.

About 11:15 P.M. a street car stopped at the intersection of two streets in the city of Rockford to discharge passengers. After the car started a person was seen running alongside it, hailing the motorman. The car stopped again and the defendant boarded it. He drew from his pocket a gun and pointed it at the motorman, William Sayles. With an oath he demanded the motorman to give up his money. The demand was complied with. The motorman was ordered to the rear of the car and then the defendant demanded and received the money possessed by the seven or eight

[top right] [February 1932]

[top center] -2-

[left] passengers, who were also compelled to go to the rear. When he was ready to leave he made the passenger and motorman take the places originally occupied by them. He took some "slugs" from the motorman's hand and threw them to the floor. He pulled the cap off the motorman and threw it down. As he stepped off the car the motorman struck at him, and then the defendant fire five shots into the body of the motorman, who soon died. The defendant left the car and ran down the street, firing one or two shots into the air. The testimony tends strongly to show that he was under the influence of liquor at this time and immediately after the killing.

In all cases where a party pleads guilty and where the court possesses any discretion as to the extent of the punishment it is the duty of the court to examine witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense. (Crim. Code, div. 13, Sec. 4). In this state there are no degrees of murder, but whoever is found guilty of that crime must suffer the punishment of death or imprisonment in the penitentiary for his natural life or for a term not less than fourteen years. Therefore, in this case the presiding judge was vested with discretionary power either to impose a sentence of death, or imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, or for a definite term not less than fourteen years. It is the declared legal policy of this State to require a judge having any descretion over punishments to conduct an inquiry before he shall sentence one who has entered a plea of guilty. This requirement is in the nature of a privilege accorded to the State that it may show aggravation, and to the defendant that he may show circumstances in mitigation. This right may be waived by the parties, (People V. Pennington, 267 Ill. 45; People V. Gerke, 322 id. 583; People V. Crooks, 326 id. 266.) but in the absence of a waiver the court

[top right] [February 1932]

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[left] should not fail in its duty to conduct a hearing. In murder cases, especially, this obligation is of the highest importance because of the exceeding latitude allowed the court. The spread between a sentence of fourteen years and a penalty of death is so vast that a judge should not impose the extreme penalty except after a hearing and serious considerations of the surrounding facts and circumstances which may tend towards aggravation or mitigation of the offense. The examination of witnesses for this purpose does not constitute a trial in the ordinary sense of the word. The hearing is not for the purpose of determining guilt or innocence but has for its sole object the determination of the degree of punishment of the prisoner in the light of the circumstances surrounding him. (People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142.) In deciding this question the court is not confined to the evidence showing guilt, for that issue has been settled by the plea. The rules of evidence which ordinarily obtain in a trial where guilt is denied do not bind the court in its inquiry. It may look to the facts of the killing, and it may search anywhere, within reasonable bounds, for other facts that tend to aggravate or mitigate the offense. In doing so it may inquire into the general moral character of the offender, his mentality, his habits, his social environments, his abnormal and subnormal tendencies, his age, his natural inclinations or aversion to commit crime, the stimuli which motivate his conduct, and, as we said in People v. Popescue, supra, the judge should know something of the life, family, occupation and record of the person about to be sentenced. Fixing the extent of punishment for crime has not, and probably never can have, a definite scientific or philosophical basis. In the time of Sir William Blackstone there were one hundred and sixty crimes punish-