Logic Notebook 1867 March-Oct

1867 March 23 17r 31

I cannot explain the deep emotion with which I open this book again. Here I write but never after read what I have written for what I write is done in the process of forming a conception. Yet I cannot forget that here are the germs of the theory of the cate gories which is (if anything is) the gift I make to the world. That is my child. [Thru ?] it I shall live when oblivion has me -- my body.

that it is the name of a class of things among which S is and if M is P not merely in the lense that _ _ _ _

then S is P.

Here the principle is that That which is U is what U is.

Everyone of the integrant parts of m is an integrant part of each prime alignot of m x vice sensor

A purely contentless principle. So a logical principle should be.

Now let us take up the synthetic arguments. Whatever is a character of every thing denoted by U is a character of U. Whatever is has every character of U is denoted by m.

Here are two principles. But they do not apply to induction's hypothesis just as they stand.

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Whatever is a common character of many things devoted by M is likely to be a character of m.

That does not quite [fit ??] the [ferish ??] It does not contain the idea that the things must have been taken at random out of those devoted by M.

In what [point ??] of view shall we regard this necessity for a random selection? Suppose we look at the matter thus. Certain things have a certain character in common. It follows that these must be some genus of these things which have the character. We cannot take any genus lower [than ??] that which they are selected as belonging to. To take a higher one would involve a perfectly arbitrary [povfoition].

I am convinced that this is a very awkward way of taking hold of the matter.

Suppose we take it up another way for any subject or predicate we can substitute what?

Only that which this subject or predicate represents -- only that which fulfills the function of that subject or predicate -- only that which the subject or predicate represents to to the [proposition ??] or to the other terms of [it ??].

Now a subject is a direct symbol of its subject to its predicate [and ??] of its a predicate of its predicate to its subject.

But a subject is also an imperfect representation of that genus from which it has been taken -- by which it is determined. It is not a semion sign of it as I have been said. It is an example of it.

A predicate is a representation of the thing of which it is a random character -- a copy of it.

This is horribly vague.

Only that which this subject or predicate represents -- only that which fulfills the function of that subject or predicate -- only that which the subject or predicate represents to to the [proposition ??] or to the other terms of [it ??].

Now a subject is a direct symbol of its subject to its predicate [and ??] of its a predicate of its predicate to its subject.

But a subject is also an imperfect representation of that genus from which it has been taken -- by which it is determined. It is not a semion sign of it as I have been said. It is an example of it.

A predicate is a representation of the thing of which it is a random character -- a copy of it.

This is horribly vague.