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is, for me, a supposititious thinking, a thinking that parades
as a self-development of thought but is in fact begotten
by some other sire than reason; and this has substantially been
the usual view of modern logicians. For reasoning ceases to
be Reason when it is no longer reasonable: thinking ceases to be
Thought when true thought disowns it. A self-development of Thought
takes the course that thinking will take that is sufficiently deliberate,
and is not truly a self-development if it slips from being the
thought of one object-thought to being the thought of another
object-thought. It is, in the geological sense, a “fault”;— an inconformability
in the strata of thinking. The discussion of it does not
appertain to pure logic, but to the application of logic to psychology.
I only notice it here, as throwing a light upon what I do not mean by