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all of these elements; and it is very different in the
memory of the color a quarter of a second after the actual sensation
from what it is in the sensation itself, although this memory is conceivably
perfectly true as to hue, luminosity, and chroma, which truth constitutes
it an exact reproduction of the entire Quality of the Feeling.

It follows that since the vividness of a Feeling,— which would be
more accurately described as the vividness of consciousness of the Feeling,
— is independent of every component of the Quality of that consciousness,
and consequently is independent of the resultant of those components,
which resultant Quality is the Feeling itself. We thus learn what
Vividness is not; and it only remains to ascertain what else it is.

To this end, two remarks will be useful. The first is that of
whatever is in the mind in any mode of consciousness there is necessarily