74

93-1823—CONCUR

26 MISSOURI v. JENKINS

state and local governments to work toward the benefit
of those who have suffered no harm from their actions.

To ensure that district courts do not embark on such
broad initiatives in the future, we should demand that
remedial decrees be more precisely designed to benefit
only those who have been victims of segregation. Race-
conscious remedies for discrimination not only must
serve a compelling governmental interest (which is met
in desegregation cases), but also must be narrowly
tailored to further that interest. See Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 509-510 (1989) (plurality
opinion). In the absence of special circumstances, the
remedy for de jure segregation ordinarily should not
include educational programs for students who were not
in school (or were even alive) during the period of
segregation. Although I do not doubt that all KCMSD
students benefit from many of the initiatives ordered by
the court below, it is for the democratically accountable
state and local officials to decide whether they are to be
made available even to those who were never harmed by
segregation.

III

This Court should never approve a State's efforts to
deny students, because of their race, an equal opportuni-
ty for an education. But the federal courts also should
avoid using racial equality as a pretext for solving social
problems that do not violate the Constitution. It seems
apparent to me that the District Court undertook the
worthy task of providing a quality education to the
children of KCMSD. As far as I can tell, however, the
District Court sought to bring new funds and facilities
into the KCMSD by finding a constitutional violation on
the part of the State where there was none. Federal
courts should not lightly assume that States have caused
"racial isolation" in 1984 by maintaining a segregated
school system in 1954. We must forever put aside the