79

93-1823-dissent

4 MISSOURI v. JENKINS

the Court recognizes, the District Court acted well
within the bounds of its equitable discretion in doing so,
ante, at 19, 30; in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267
(1977) (Milliken II), we held that a district court is
authorized to remedy all conditions flowing directly from
the constitutional violations committed by state or local
officials, including the educational deficits that result
from a segregated school system (programs aimed to
correct those deficits are therefore frequently referred to
as Milliken II programs). Id., at 281-283. Nor was
there any objection to the District Court's orders from
the State and the KCMSD, who agreed that it was
"'appropriate to include a number of properly targeted
educational programs in (the) desegregation plan,'"
Jenkins, 639 F. Supp., at 24 (quoting from the State's
desegregation proposal). They endorsed many of the
initiatives directed at improving student achievement
that the District Court ultimately incorporated into its
decree, including those calling for the attainment of AAA
status for the KCMSD (a designation, conferred by the
State Department of Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion upon consideration of a limited number of criteria,
indicating "that a school system quantitatively and
qualitatively has the resources necessary to provide
minimum basic education to its students," id., at 26),
full day kindergarten, summer school, tutoring before
and after school, early childhood development, and
reduction in class sizes. Id., at 24-26

Between 1985 and 1987 the District Court also
ordered the implementation of a magnet school concept,
1 App, 131-133 (Order of Nov. 12, 1986), and extensive
capital improvements to the schools of the KCMSD.
Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 405-408 (WD Mo.
1987); 1 App. 133-134 (Order of Nov. 12, 1986); Jenkins,
639 F. Supp., at 39-41. The District court found that
magnet schools would not only serve to remedy the
deficiencies in student achivement in the KCMSD, but