2110-6-9-10

19th Nov. 1934

46, RUTLAND GATE, S.W.7.

Dear Sir

I have just read with the greatest interest and pleasure your little book on Gordon and I wonder whether you would consider it extremely impertinent of me to ask you a question regarding the Epilogue.

This necessarily condenses into the smallest compass the years which passed between the tragedy of 1884 and the fall of Khartum in 1898 and I have no intention of criticising the manner in which you have used your discretion as to what should be included and what omitted.

But it appears to me that your account of the events of those 14 years might be read by the present generation as meaning that successive Governments had before

them the steadfast intention of advancing sooner or later up the Nile and re-conquering the Sudan.

Early in 1896, as a young Captain, I was engaged with another young Captain, Henry Wilson, in the old intelligence division of the War Office in watching the development of Marchand's expedition to the Nile. Owing to the fact that the Central department of the War Office was in Pall Mall and our office in Queen Anne's Gate and that all official letters had to be sent there for signature, a system of "semi official" correspondence was started by which the Intelligence Division, in order to save time, was allowed to correspond direct with other Departments. The Central office in Pall Mall never had the faintest idea of the extent to which this privilege was used but the practical result was that it brought us into direct touch with the

Foreign Office, Colonial Office etc and the public probably have no idea what tremendous advantage was gained by the adoption of a system which enabled the various departments to express themselves with a freedom which was impossible in more official language - and with a minimum of delay. As a result we young officers were constantly over in the Foreign Office and clerks from that office were constantly with us and so we both of us got acquainted with one another's views and we had an insight into Lord Salisbury's policy which we could not have obtained through the "usual" channel of correspondence.

Naturally, as Marchand advanced more and more eastward, we became more alarmed as to what would be the result of his mission and it seemed at one time as if it was quite impossible to prevent the French from completing their east to west project and I can say definitely that early in 1896 we were quite unable to glean that

there was the slightest possibility of an advance up the Nile; in fact I can recall an occasion when Lord Salisbury told me himself that, after the failure of 1884, the British public were sick of the Sudan and that nothing would be so unpopular as to launch an expedition to reconquer it. We know however that later in 1896 the expedition to Dongola was approved. This brings me to the question that I want to ask you - bluntly it comes to this - is the omission in your book to give the reason for this change and the true cause of our advance up the Nile due to the necessity of condensing the narration or is it due to the fact that the real ostensible reason for our advance up the Nile and for the change in public opinion has now been forgotten? I may perhaps add that in 1898 I stood in the corner of the staircase where Gordon was killed and heard the facts through an interpreter from an eyewitness of his death.

Ever yours truly

F.S. Robb.